

24 JUN 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SIG-I Working Group

FROM:

Executive Officer
Office of Security/CIA

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SUBJECT: Comments Regarding Draft Section VII
of Presidential Report

1. Our comments regarding Draft Section VII are as follows:

° VII.C.1.b. - Unfortunately, CIA does not have any data which will assist in helping other agencies obtain the requested legislative relief. We have not found redaction, when done properly, to result in the compromise of identifying information nor have we found informants unwilling to cooperate because of any actual compromise. In general we feel that if redaction is done properly, there is no problem. While we recognize that it is not always possible to properly redact documents without leaving only the margins intact, we fear that the requirement to provide subjects with summaries is not a fix without problems of its own. Some reasons:

a. A summary of key facts establishing the issues on which a security decision is based is really a statement of reasons; a summary could easily provide the subject with more information than a set of properly redacted documents. In our view, this pushes the Privacy Act beyond its intended scope.

b. The background investigation would remain available to the Subject under FOIA. Without similar amendment to FOIA, a BI, for example, would be redacted in the same way as it would be under the unamended PA.

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Therefore, we would object to this initiative unless,
 (a) it were made optional, to be used at the agencies' discretion when redaction is not deemed effective and,
 (b) the initiative is reworded to provide only for a summary statement of the key elements of materials deemed unsuitable for redaction which would otherwise be releasable under applicable law. Reference to any requirement to provide a summary of the issues on which the security decision was based should be deleted, although it is recognized that such will often be the topic of a summary.

° VII.E. - We believe the appropriate remedy is enforcement of existing criminal penalties. To do otherwise only serves to dilute or weaken the penalty and to improperly focus the reason for the law on the cost of resolving the false information. The true purpose of the law is to reduce perjury so that the national security can be properly protected. It is recommended that this initiative call for vigorous prosecution under existing law.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET****SUBJECT:** (Optional)**Comments Regarding Draft Subsections 3 and 4 of Sec VI. F. of
Presidential Report****FROM:****NO.****DATE** 20 June 1986

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)**DATE****RECEIVED****FORWARDED****OFFICER'S
INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

20 JUN 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SIG-I Working Group

FROM:

Executive Officer
Office of Security/CIA

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SUBJECT: Comments Regarding Draft Subsections
3 and 4 of Sec VI. F. of Presidential Report

1. The following comments represent the CIA input on subsections 3 and 4 from the countermeasures viewpoint. Due to the limited time to prepare responses, the counterintelligence input is being prepared separately:

Page 1 re Enhancing Professionalism - the statement that "Skilled, dedicated personnel, who are motivated to excel, can more than compensate for material inadequacies" pays well deserved compliment to overworked security personnel but seems inconsistent with our previous assertions that lack of funding has been the major cause of security woes. It is suggested that the phrase, "can more than compensate" be replaced with "are as necessary as adequate resourcing."

Page 8, second paragraph, last sentence - While we see room for improvement, CIA considers its training and education program to be well structured and certainly geared to career development. We offer basic instruction leading to professional certification in investigations, adjudications, polygraphy and TSCM, and two levels of certification in TEMPEST. Moreover, a wide variety of other skills and career-related training is made available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Page 10, second paragraph - It is recommended that the phrase, "...of requisite caliber to ensure academic credit leading to an advanced degree" be deleted. This is a difficult and sometimes impractical goal for many types of training, particularly when covert instructors and classified course content are involved. It may well be desirable to the degree practicable, but not the driving force for security training.

SIGNED

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!OS/EO/PPS [Redacted Box] (20 June 86)!

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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REMARKS

For comment, pl by noon 19 June
or sooner, if possible.
Sbx-EB.

1 to 3 - strictly, except &
mostly applicable to DOD &
other Agencies, but not CIA..
statement on p 1 underlined in
green should be struck from the
report.

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VI. F. PROVIDE THE REQUISITE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE TO ENSURE
BALANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE PURSUIT OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES

1. (Previously provided)
2. (Previously provided)
3. Enhancing Professionalism

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As is true of any field of endeavor, the quality of the work force is the basic measure of counterintelligence and security capabilities. Skilled, dedicated personnel, who are motivated to excel, can more than ? compensate for material inadequacies. The preconditions for the development of a professional corps of that caliber are straight forward: competitive pay scales, challenging tasks, upward mobility within a defined career path, progressive training and education, reasonable incentives for extraordinary achievement, and promotions strictly geared to demonstrated performance.

a. Career Development

The Counterintelligence Community. With the exception of the Defense Intelligence Agency (which has an analytic function only) none of the counterintelligence agencies have a "cradle to grave" career path. Personnel enter the intelligence division of the FBI from the ranks of the law enforcement officials and frequently return for periods of time to the law enforcement area during the course of their service; a similar, rotative pattern pertains in the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and the Navy's Investigative Service, where counterintelligence assignments alternate with ones in the criminal investigation field. By contrast, the

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REMARKS

For comment, pls by noon 19 Jun
or sooner, if possible; JH

No major problems.

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OPTIONAL FORM 42 (Rev. 7-70)
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*U.S.G.P.O.: 1983 - 421-529/320

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DCI/ICS-86-0836
12 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: SIG-I Working Group Members

FROM:


Chairman

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SUBJECT: Remainder of Section VI.

1. Attached herewith are subsections 3. (Enhancing Professionalism) and 4. (Security Awareness), completing the drafting of Section VI.F. of the Presidential report.

2. These subsections can be criticized for being too cursory, but many quarters feel the draft report is already too long. I have worked from a very inadequate data base on CM training, but do know the situation in DoD where 90 percent of the action is. In any case, I request your comments in any form not later than COB 19 June.


3. Expect to get out preliminary draft of Section VII. (Enabling Legislation) on 16 June. It will go to lawyer's group, with info copy to working group principals. Draft of short sections C., D., and E. should be out by the end of the same week for attention of the CI community.

4. The Chairman, SIG-I has directed that I proceed at flank speed with preparation of the Executive Summary as soon as adequate administrative support can be arranged; and, concurrently, whip main report into final shape. I want to have a short meeting with you next Thursday afternoon to discuss these matters. Details of time/place will be communicated separately.

5. Happy Father's Day.

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Attachment:
a/s



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VI. F. PROVIDE THE REQUISITE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE TO ENSURE
BALANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE PURSUIT OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES

1. (Previously provided)
2. (Previously provided)
3. Enhancing Professionalism

As is true of any field of endeavor, the quality of the work force is the basic measure of counterintelligence and security capabilities. Skilled, dedicated personnel, who are motivated to excel, can more than compensate for material inadequacies. The preconditions for the development of a professional corps of that caliber are straight forward: competitive pay scales, challenging tasks, upward mobility within a defined career path, progressive training and education, reasonable incentives for extraordinary achievement, and promotions strictly geared to demonstrated performance.

a. Career Development

The Counterintelligence Community. With the exception of the Defense Intelligence Agency (which has an analytic function only) none of the counterintelligence agencies have a "cradle to grave" career path. Personnel enter the intelligence division of the FBI from the ranks of the law enforcement officials and frequently return for periods of time to the law enforcement area during the course of their service; a similar, rotative pattern pertains in the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and the Navy's Investigative Service, where counterintelligence assignments alternate with ones in the criminal investigation field. By contrast, the

counterintelligence elements of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army are comprised of individuals initially trained as foreign intelligence operatives in the Directorate of Operations and the Intelligence and Security Command respectively and who, thereafter, alternate assignments therein. The several agencies are convinced that these arrangements meet their particular needs. Based thereon, they have developed--or are in the process of developing--personnel management frameworks providing for progressive training and education, for advancement to assignments of increasing responsibilities in field and staff positions and for specialization in particular areas to the extent that an individual so desires.

In short, the personnel policies now in place throughout the counterintelligence community generally meet the aforementioned preconditions for development of a professional corps. This does not mean that implementation of those policies is fully satisfactory. It simply means that steps to improve the professionalism of counterintelligence personnel should be within the context of overall agency personnel programs. Agency leadership and program managers must ensure that the corps of counterintelligence personnel are equal claimants for enhanced grade structure, promotion opportunities, advanced training, intra- and inter-departmental assignments, and professional recognition.

There will be two broad measures of success. One is the attraction and retention of a just share of talent. The other is convincing counterintelligence personnel that they have an equal opportunity to advance to the top management positions within their parent agency.

The Security Community. The Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, and National Security Agency have career development programs for the security field; the Department of State is evolving a Diplomatic Security Service. Elsewhere in the executive branch, scant attention has been paid to career planning for security specialists. In part, this is due to lack of top management awareness of the importance, the scope, and the complexities of security and sensitivity to the adverse morale impact of placing unqualified personnel into positions which should be occupied by security professionals. In greater part, it is due to seriously out of date federal job classification standards which fail to describe the breadth, depth, and dynamics of the security field. Security positions to be filled, position objectives, and position standards are ill-defined. In short, for the government as a whole, there is no concept of security professionalism embracing selection, hiring, training, promoting, and disciplining career security personnel. There is a clear need for a security management improvement program with the primary objective of establishing career development opportunities.

After lengthy discussions stimulated by Defense, the Office of Personnel Management will undertake an occupational study of the Security Administration Series (GS-080) classification and qualification standards on a priority basis, and has also agreed to a cooperative effort to explore other measures to enhance the security work force--measures that could be applicable to the federal service as a whole. This effort will include such factors as special pay rates, improved recruiting programs, better training, higher physical qualifications standards, better performance

management, and incentive awards. This is a highly highly significant project. The hoped-for result is development of goal-oriented descriptions of positions, functions, and standards which will, for the first time, establish security as a discrete field with a clear public service role; and, in turn, provide the foundation for agency management improvement programs attuned to the 1990s.

With success of this cooperative effort as a given, Defense has evolved the basic features of an improvement program for its several components. In essence, it would provide for a security personnel development and management system, including: career patterns visible at the entry level; career entry examinations and a system of in-career professional certifications; progression in the main categories of personnel, information and physical security, security education and security management; opportunities for specialization within each category; scope for interdisciplinary exchanges among security personnel; and accession of the fittest to high level managerial positions in the security field. The improvement programs of other agencies will, perforce, be structured differently. But whatever their form, the end objective must be a systemized means to produce security professionals capable of handling any operational situation while advancing to management positions.

- Because substantial enhancement of professionalism depends on positive results from the OPM-DoD cooperative effort, the work should be strongly encouraged and closely monitored by the SIG-Security; the Secretary of Defense and Director, Office of Personnel Management, should provide the NSC with a joint progress report at year's end.

b. Training/Education

Formal training (including, in some instances, university courses) is integral to career development programs. Subject to such minimum standards as may be prescribed by executive order or other Presidential-level directive, individual agencies determine the specific training and education their counterintelligence and/or security personnel must have to perform assigned duties and to qualify for advancement. For valid reasons, there are no interagency (or national) counterintelligence training facilities and only a handful in the security area. Thus, agencies with counterintelligence elements maintain in-house capabilities for the training of their personnel. Similarly, those agencies with a substantial complement of personnel assigned security responsibilities normally conduct their own training, much of it informal and ad hoc; the exceptions are in highly technical subdisciplines where consolidated facilities have been established. Agencies with modest numbers of employees assigned security functions can usually arrange for enrollment of those individuals in pertinent courses of instruction conducted by the larger agencies.

Counterintelligence Community. While there are some areas of commonality, the overall training programs of the FBI, CIA, and the military services vary markedly one from the other. This is so because of pronounced differences in functions, environments in which functions are performed, and, consequently, skills required. Reflecting their preeminent counterintelligence responsibilities in the United States and abroad, respectively, the programs

of the FBI and CIA are more extensive than those of the military services. Nonetheless, the variety and caliber of courses conducted by the Air Force and Navy are adjudged to be satisfactory, with the Army rapidly approaching the same level.

The IG/CI has recently completed an in-depth study of training within the counterintelligence community, with focus on the interagency aspects thereof. The overall conclusions are twofold:

- There is today (in contrast to the past) a high degree of interagency cooperation, including a healthy exchange of instructors, students, and course materials; and rather extensive participation in joint training exercises (primarily FBI and CIA personnel).
- There is no merit to the concept of an interagency training facility to consolidate the capabilities now maintained by the several agencies. The disadvantages are simply overwhelming. Because of the unique responsibilities and consequent training requirements of each component of the Community, a joint facility would have only administrative support as its common element.

Each of the counterintelligence agencies maintains relatively small training staffs, all located in the Washington area and therefore in close proximity to the headquarters of their parent agency and top CI management. Thus, the resident training staffs can be--and are--augmented and enriched by a variety of part-time instructors and special

topic lecturers. These augmentations are provided by operational and analytic elements of the parent agency, by instructor personnel of other counterintelligence agencies, and by experts from outside the counterintelligence community. This instructional methodology is both substantively efficient and cost-effective.

Individual agencies have traditionally made space available in their courses for students from other agencies whenever security permits. This pattern can be expected to continue and probably expand.

There is scope to improve the cross flow of course materials. In this connection, it has recently been decided to convene more frequent and formalized meetings of training officers of the several agencies to share training experiences and techniques. Also under consideration is the development of specific groupings of courses which would support a certification program, be suitable for cross-training a given specialist in a second skill area, and/or provide competence in a critical functional area such as multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis.

Likewise, the quality of training can and should be enhanced. It has high payoff in any activity--and especially in counterintelligence. Increasing skills in the conduct of offensive counterintelligence operations must be at the top of the priority list.

The Security Community. The overall state of training in the security community is unsatisfactory. To be sure, the dimensions of the security

challenge and resultant countermeasure requirements are rapidly expanding. To be sure, also, a few agencies have excellent training programs for some of the security subdisciplines. But generally speaking, the community has not faced its training responsibilities in a serious manner. The underlying reasons mirror those elaborated in the foregoing discussion of career development shortcomings.

A number of specific training deficiencies have been cited in earlier sections of this report (e.g., lack of training of adjudicators of security clearances and of personnel with classification management responsibilities; need for standards and course materials for training of TEMPEST authorities; requirement to refurbish the interagency TSCM Training Center; need for wider appreciation of and training in OPSEC). These only illustrate the problem. With security training decentralized for the most part, with training standards notable for their absence, with no national-level oversight and therefore no basic data base, an analysis comparable to that accomplished for counterintelligence training could not now be prepared. From the information available, it would appear that only the NSA has a fully structured training and educational program, geared to career development and resulting in professional certification for various specialties. ?

For the same reasons that apply to counterintelligence training, security training has been, and should continue to be, accomplished intra-agency. The few exceptions are in specialties which are not sensitive to environmental or mission peculiarities and where manageable student load

and cost of training infrastructure dictate consolidation. Thus, the DoD Polygraph Institute serves all of the executive branch except CIA; the Defense Security Institute provides resident or correspondent courses for all security officers of corporations under contract to 19 government departments and agencies; and the CIA administers the Interagency Training Center (ITC) which provides basic and advanced courses for the entire community in the detection, prevention, and handling of hostile technical penetrations. Apart from these centralized facilities, there is considerable community cooperation in exchange of students, in cross-utilization of instructors, in provision of guest lecturers, and participation in security seminars and workshops.

Ongoing training activity, both intra- and interagency, is far below desirable levels in both scope and quality. There are few mandatory training requirements, with the result that unqualified personnel are occupying significant security positions. On-the-job training is the norm for many individuals. Much of the scheduled training is ad hoc and informal. Most often, training intakes are not recorded in personnel jackets.

There are some heartening signs that belated emphasis is being focused on training. The Secretary of Defense recently directed implementation of three related recommendations of the Stilwell Commission. One was to establish minimal levels of required training (and development of basic courses of instruction associated therewith) for all DoD personnel performing security duties. A second requires all DoD contractor security officers to complete some type of uniform training. A third would make satisfactory completion of specified training a precondition to DoD

certification as a security specialist. Training management will be a major, continuing activity of the evolving State Department Diplomatic Security Service, with the key mid-term tasks of developing new facilities, harnessing additional instructor personnel, and conducting intensified courses of instruction. The CIA and the Department of Energy, with excellent security organizational frameworks in place, are planning substantial upgrade of training capabilities.

Clearly, concerted actions must be taken to modernize, regularize, and intensify security training as fundamental to the enhancement of professionalism. The goal should be career training programs, beginning with basic courses leading to certification as a professional, of requisite caliber to ensure academic credit leading to an advanced degree. Sustained efforts over considerable time will be required to bring the entire community to an acceptable plateau. And first things must come first:

- Concurrent with the development of the revision of Security Administration Series (GS-080), OPM should, in coordination with Defense and other agencies primarily concerned, establish minimal levels of training (i.e., standards) required for certification as security manager and all other security specialists encompassed by that updated regulation.
- Incremental issuances should be made, as necessary, with priority given to adjudicators of security clearances and industrial security officers.

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-- ^ The NSC should enjoin compliance with these standards and encourage government-wide acceptance.

- NTISSC should issue training standards for certification as TEMPEST authority.
- The NSDD to be issued designating executive agents for R&D should specify that CIA's responsibility for TSCM includes centralized training conducted under CIA management by an interagency complement of instructors. ✓
- The NSA, currently charged with conduct of the national OPSEC course, should update and distribute basic course materials for use throughout all agencies that the proposed NSDD will direct to establish OPSEC programs.
- The SIG-Security should create a forum for regular interagency meetings of senior training officers. ✓
- Given its potential for contributing to the improvement of training throughout the executive branch, the SIG-Security should closely monitor the progress of the Defense Security Institute in developing education and training programs for DoD civilian, military, and contractor personnel.

- Status of security training should be made an item of recurring interest for agency Inspector General.

4. Security Awareness

An essential element of any security program is appreciation by all ranks that the rules they are expected to observe are meaningful. Basic to this understanding is painstaking and repeated exposition of the activities of the hostile intelligence services, the threat those services pose to classified information, and the implications of compromise or loss of that information. Security is everybody's business and, most notably, that of the individuals in charge. As with all other responsibilities vested in them, it is incumbent upon commanders and supervisors to underscore the importance of security by personal example.

Those agencies with significant and classified functions have long had programs--built around briefings, publications, and posters--to inculcate and sustain the security consciousness of its personnel. Those agencies only tangentially involved with intelligence, foreign affairs and military matters have not in the past had formal security awareness programs. The recently promulgated NSDD-197 stressed that the latter category of agencies were also vulnerable to the loss of information or technology which could be critical to the ability of the United States to protect itself; and mandated that every agency would establish a formal program to ensure a high level of security awareness among its employees of the potential threat to

proprietary, sensitive and/or classified information entrusted to their individual and collective safeguarding.

Given the high priority that the Soviet, Soviet surrogate, and PRC services accord advanced technology as a collection target, awareness of the threat throughout the government contractor world is particularly important. It is also the most difficult area to reach by reason of its wide-flung, non-hierarchical nature. For some years the FBI has sponsored a Development of Counterintelligence Awareness (DECA) program to explicate the threat posed by the HOIS to the personnel, facilities and operations of firms that have classified contracts. The briefings are well-done but, at the current level of effort, they reach only a small portion of the approximately 1.5 million cleared contractor employees. [] found that the combined industry-oriented programs of the FBI, the military departments, and the Defense Investigative Service were most inadequate; and, per the Commission's recommendation, the Secretary of Defense has directed that immediate steps be taken to increase the coverage and effectiveness and improve the coordination, of security awareness programs in industry.

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With policies in place, the challenge is in the execution thereof. Aside from the vigorous implementation of NSDD-197 by each agency concerned, the principal interagency tasks are to:

- Charge an existing mechanism to act as a clearing house for interagency exchange and dissemination of briefing, scripts, audiovisual aids and the like. The objective is to enhance the

effectiveness of security awareness programs while at the same time effecting economy of effort by evolving the materials which are dynamic, graphic, calculated to maintain audience interest and adaptable, on the margin, to suit unique agency needs. The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Defense Security Institute take on this particular function as a common service for the DoD components; and thus can be a significant contributor to this overall effort.

- Develop plans to heighten the security awareness of the public at large. Currently, only a minute segment of the populace is reached through speeches of senior personnel of the FBI and the activities of a number of professional associations. The Bureau should be asked to increase the scope of its DECA program and, through its regional offices, seek public fora for appropriately tailored briefings to opinion leaders on the reality of the threat. Concurrently, the DoD should be tasked to determine how the network of military installations throughout the country can assist this general educational effort.
- Since the Defense Industrial Security program functions on behalf of 19 executive branch agencies, the state of security awareness in industry is a matter of interagency import; and, moreover, security awareness programs targeted on industry are conducted by both DoD instrumentalities and the FBI. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense should be tasked to report annually on the accomplishments in revitalizing awareness in this sector, possibly utilizing his

National Industrial Security Advisory Committee to assist in
developing that evaluation.